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A TURNING POINT IN MERGER ENFORCEMENT:   
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION v. STAPLES 
 
Jonathan B. Baker and Robert Pitofsky1 
 
 
1. Opening Day 
The first day of merger trials is usually a staid and dry affair.  Not so with Staples-Office 
Depot.  At the rear of the courtroom, counsel advocating the merger hung a large banner with the 
emphatic message “Save Even More.”  Defense counsel’s opening statement was illustrated with 
a large number of exhibits and charts and with audio interludes.  And every seat in the courtroom 
was taken - by lawyers, journalists, and stock market speculators (arbitrageurs) betting on who 
would win and who would lose the case.   
The court proceeding was not an effort by the government to block the merger 
permanently.  Rather its goal was to obtain a preliminary injunction preventing the merger from 
being consummated pending a full trial.  Without that kind of injunction, the parties can often 
scramble the assets of the two firms with the result that a remedy is close to impossible.  On the 
other hand, mergers are time sensitive:  a long pending transaction held up by government 
review in a full trial can have an adverse effect on the morale of executives and staff, adversely 
affect stock market prices, and harm firm reputations (particularly of the acquired firm) in the 
marketplace.  As a result, the award of a preliminary injunction usually means the end of the deal 
in practical terms. 
                                                 
1 Jonathan Baker is Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University;  
Robert Pitofsky is Joseph and Madeline Sheehy Professor of Antitrust Law, Georgetown 
University Law School.  We are grateful to Bill Baer and George Cary for helpful discussions, 
and to Farrell Malone of Georgetown Law School and Ian Hoffman of William and Mary Law 
School, for their excellent assistance in preparing this paper; errors of course are ours.  
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The lead attorneys for the government and for the merging firms - George Cary for the 
government, and Donald Kempf for the merging parties - laid out the essentials of their case in 
opening statements to Judge Thomas Hogan.  As is common in merger cases, there was no jury.  
Cary explained that the merger would have an effect on a market that he described as 
consumable office supplies - that is, pencils, pens, post-it notes, paper, even staples - the sort of 
product that people return again and again to purchase.  It would not include furniture, business 
machines and computers.  He described how the office supply superstore concept had only been 
initiated a dozen years earlier, with Staples in the lead, and at its maximum had more than twenty 
participants.  By the time of the hearing, the industry had grown fantastically – Staples and 
Office Depot together accounted for more than $10 billion in annual sales – but there were only 
three office supply superstore chains left:  the merging parties, Office Depot and Staples, and 
OfficeMax.  He explained that the government case would be primarily a matter of documents 
and that the government intended to prove that in geographic areas where three office supply 
superstores were present and competed, prices were at their lowest; when two were present 
prices increased; and prices were at their highest when there was only one.  He said the 
government would demonstrate that Office Depot generally had lower prices than Staples and 
was cutting into its profitability.  Staples faced a stark decision:  either meet Office Depot’s 
lower prices in the marketplace and reduce its own profits or acquire Office Depot by merger.  It 
chose the latter.  He then stated what he thought was the heart of the government’s case: 
“What will be the effect on prices?  The key fact of this case, Your 
Honor, is that where Office Depot and Staples compete, their 
prices are five to ten to fifteen percent lower than where they don’t 
compete.  . . . All of the evidence directly answers the ultimate 
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question . . .  Will prices likely be higher after the merger than they 
would have been without the merger?”2 
Don Kempf responded for the defendants in a variety of ways.  He argued first that the 
government’s description of the marketplace was wildly wrong.  Rather than carve out the three 
office supply superstores as a separate competitive arena, he argued that mass merchandisers like 
WalMart and KMart, traditional small store retailers, direct mail and internet sales compete with 
superstores in the sale of office supplies and, therefore, those sellers should be included in the 
market.  In a “properly defined” product market, the combined market share of Staples and 
Office Depot would be somewhere between and five and six percent, well below any sensible 
line where a merger should be challenged.  He then noted that the whole history of the office 
supply superstore segment had been one of reducing prices to consumers, referring time and 
again to the “productivity loop.”  Under that theory, the large scale superstores can extract lower 
prices from stationery and other suppliers and then pass those lower prices along to consumers, 
as they had consistently done in the past, in order to increase market share.  With larger market 
shares, the superstores could return to their suppliers and achieve even lower prices.   
Kempf used the productivity loop to support his argument that high levels of 
concentration in this particular industry would not lead to higher prices.  He emphasized that 
experience showed the opposite:  as the industry consolidated, and the number of superstore 
chains declined over the previous decade from twenty to three, prices had continued to decline. 
The government’s pricing evidence was simply “cherry picking” of unrepresentative examples 
and “nonsense correlations,” according to Kempf.  Finally, he said he was prepared to 
demonstrate that somewhere between $5 and $6 billion in savings could be achieved through 
                                                 
2  Transcript (May 19, 1997) at 13-14. 
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improved efficiencies, and again that history showed that the office supply superstores passed 
along large portions of those efficiencies to consumers.  He sidestepped the point that the 
government would constantly press:  even conceding that prices had declined in the office supply 
superstore segment of the economy, the government contended they would have declined even 
more in the presence of vigorous competition. 
2. The Players.   
The government’s challenge to the proposed merger of Staples and Office Depot was no 
small deal.  Staples was the second largest office supply superstore chain in the United States 
with 550 stores and revenues of about $4 billion; Office Depot was the largest office supply 
superstore chain with more than 500 stores and revenues of a little over $6 billion.  The only 
other substantial office supply superstore chain was OfficeMax, also with more than 500 stores.3  
All three chains were growing rapidly, each adding roughly one hundred stores per year 
nationwide and expanding into regions historically served by other chains. 
As emphasized in the opening statements, one central question was whether office supply 
superstores were a separate product market in which adverse effects on competition could be 
measured.  If the superstores were a market unto themselves, then the result of the merger would 
be to reduce the number of players from two to one in 15 cities and from three to two in 27 more 
cities – more than enough concentration to attract the most serious government attention.4  Also, 
if the companies remained separate, it was predictable that each would invade the turf of the 
other over time, whereas the merger would eliminate that kind of future competition.5 
                                                 
3  FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1069 (D.D.C. 1997).   
4  Id. at 1081.   
5  Id. at 1082. 
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In the late 1990s the United States witnessed one of the most intense merger waves in the 
history of the country.6  Robert Pitofsky, one of the authors of this chapter, took office as 
Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 1995 pledging an activist antitrust agenda.  
One of his first moves was to appoint Jonathan Baker (the other author of this chapter) as head of 
the agency’s Bureau of Economics.  The Commission voted to challenge a few mergers in 1995 
and 1996.7  But the 1997 challenge to the Staples-Office Depot was far more important and 
controversial.   
The effort to obtain a preliminary injunction, beginning May 19, 1997, lasted only five 
days but it was exceptionally spirited.8  Each side was given only fifteen total hours of trial time, 
including cross-examination of witnesses, and a chess clock was used to keep track.  Before the 
trial, the Commission had reviewed hundreds of boxes of documents and had taken 18 
                                                 
6  In 2000, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) received a record high 4,926 merger filings, 
representing a 222.1% increase in the number of filings in 1991.  FTC Bureau of Competition & 
DOJ Antitrust Division, Annual Report to Congress Fiscal Year 2000, 1, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/04/annualreport2000.pdf (last visited June 20, 2006).  
7  Rite Aid’s proposed acquisition of Revco, a merger of two large pharmacy chains, was 
abandoned by the parties shortly after the FTC announced its intention to block the deal in court, 
in April 1996.  Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Rite Aid Abandons Proposed 
Acquisition of Revco After FTC Sought To Block Transaction (April 24, 1996), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1996/04/ritenogo.htm (last visited June 21, 2006).  A natural gas pipeline 
acquisition that the FTC concluded would raise prices to industrial customers around Salt Lake 
City was also abandoned after the FTC announced its challenge, in late 1995.  Press Release, 
Federal Trade Commission, FTC To Challenge Questar Acquisition of Kern River, Alleging 
Monopoly Over Natural Gas Transmission Into Salt Lake City Area (Dec. 27, 1995), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1995/12/questr.htm (last visited June 21, 2006).  In early 1996, the FTC 
went to court to challenge a Grand Rapids, Michigan hospital merger. The district court 
concluded that certain conditions it placed on the merger would solve the competitive problem 
the FTC had identified without need to enjoin the transaction; that decision was on appeal during 
the Staples litigation.  FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996), 
aff’d 121 F.3d 708, 1997 WL 420543 (6th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table opinion).  As is usual in 
merger enforcement, the FTC resolved its competitive concerns in a number of other cases – 
such as Time Warner’s acquisition of Turner Broadcasting in late 1996 – through consent 
settlement, without need to go to court.  See In the Matter of Time Warner, Inc., 123 F.T.C. 171 
(1997) (consent order).   
8  The hearing concluded with four hours of oral argument about two weeks later. 
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depositions; at trial, the defendants called eight live witnesses and introduced some 6,000 
exhibits.  After the trial, nine states filed amicus briefs supporting the Federal Trade 
Commission’s case.  On the other hand, stock market speculators and the national press were 
overwhelmingly of the view that the companies would prevail and the government would lose its 
first big merger case of the 1990s.   
3. Merger Enforcement in the United States. 
Merger policy issues have been central in the development of American antitrust policy 
since the enactment of a federal antitrust law in 1890.  Difficult policy questions arise because 
the consequences of mergers can be good or bad or a little of both.  Mergers can eliminate rivals 
and then the combined firm can raise prices to consumers.  Mergers can also be a problem by 
reducing the number of firms in a market with the result that the remaining firms can coordinate 
sales policies and act like monopolists by coordinating their marketing efforts.  There is also a 
general policy view that high levels of concentration undermine incentives to achieve efficiency 
and to innovate.9  On the other hand, in most markets, mergers among relatively small companies 
pose no threat of monopoly or coordinated behavior and can lead to efficiencies.  The combined 
firm may produce at a lower cost, engage in more aggressive research and development, or allow 
superior management to take over additional resources. 
                                                 
9  The most eloquent statement of that perspective - now a little out of date - was by Judge 
Learned Hand in 1945: 
Many people believe that possession of unchallenged economic 
power deadens initiative, discourages thrift, and depresses energy; 
that immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a 
stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur of constant stress is 
necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to let well enough 
alone. 
United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945). 
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Merger enforcement in the United States has been remarkably inconsistent over the years.  
For example, in the 1960s, the United States had a very aggressive merger policy - most people 
would now say overly aggressive - and successfully struck down mergers among very small 
firms in unconcentrated markets.10  In the 1980s, during the second term of the Reagan 
administration, merger enforcement came close to disappearing.11  The challenge in the 1990s, 
during the first Bush Administration and then the Clinton years, was to find a middle of the road 
merger policy that was active in protecting the welfare of consumers from merger-induced 
higher prices or reductions in quality, while at the same time being sensitive to protect incentives 
to improve efficiency and productivity and to achieve innovation.  The FTC’s challenge to the 
Staples-Office Depot proposed merger was regarded as a major test of its ability to restore 
effective and sensible merger enforcement – avoiding the undue activism of the 1960s and the 
extreme under-enforcement of the 1980s – while at the same time indicating the agency’s 
willingness to litigate when the situation called for direct confrontation. 
4. The FTC Decides to Challenge 
                                                 
10  There are many cases that illustrate the point, but the most indefensible under current 
standards is United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 281 (1966) where a merger 
combining grocery firms in Los Angeles of 4.7% and 4.2%, respectively, was struck down even 
though the number of chains in Los Angeles was on the increase and there were few barriers to 
new firms entering the market.  See also United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 
(1946) (combined market shares of 4.5% in one market where violation was found); Brown Shoe 
Co., 370 U.S. 323, 347-48 (horizontal merger violations found in some markets with combined 
market shares of 5% and low entry barriers; violation in the vertical line - between a shoe 
manufacturer and shoe store outlets - in the 1% to 2% category).   
11  The rate of federal enforcement actions (challenges as a fraction of proposed mergers) during 
the second term of the Reagan administration was roughly half the typical rate before and after.   
Thomas B. Leary, The Essential Stability of Merger Policy in the United States, 70 Antitrust L,J. 
105, 139 (2002); see Krattenmaker and Pitofsky, Antitrust Merger Policy in the Reagan 
Administration, 33 Antitrust Bull. 211, 213 (1988).   
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 The “first blush or initial gut reaction of many people,” Judge Hogan later wrote, 
is that with so many different types of retailers competing to sell office supplies, a merger of two 
office supply superstore chains would be unlikely to permit the merged firm to exercise market 
power.12  If post-merger Staples “raised prices after the merger, or at least did not lower them as 
much as they would have as separate companies, . . . consumers, with such a plethora of options, 
would shop elsewhere.”13  Although every merger reported to the federal enforcement agencies 
receives some review, the FTC staff cannot practically give each a hard look, and indeed the vast 
majority are given early termination, – that is, they are allowed to proceed without a “second 
request” for additional information.  Why did this transaction, seemingly unlikely on its face to 
raise an antitrust problem, receive close scrutiny from the FTC’s merger enforcers? 
Shortly after the merger was announced in September 1996, the FTC staff obtained a 
report from Prudential Securities, which followed the office superstores market for investors.  
Prudential Securities surveyed prices for a market basket of office supplies in Paramus, New 
Jersey, a town in which Staples and OfficeMax competed but not Office Depot, and compared 
them with the prices for the same market basket purchased in Totowa, New Jersey, twenty-five 
minutes away, where all three superstore chains competed.  According to Prudential Securities, 
the additional competition from Office Depot led to five percent lower prices.14  This report 
suggested to the FTC staff that the loss of competition among office superstore chains could 
affect prices, and was one reason the FTC decided to give the proposed merger a close look.   
                                                 
12  Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1075.  
13  Id.  
14  Discussed and cited in Serdar Dalkir & Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, Prices, Market 
Definition, and the Effects of Merger: Staples-Office Depot, in The Antitrust Revolution: 
Economics, Competition, and Policy 143, 153 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 3d 
ed. 1999).  
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During a typical merger investigation, the FTC staff reviews documents, testimony and 
data from the merging firms and their executives, and collects similar information from both 
rivals and customers.  Many company documents treated the office supply superstore market as 
separate and distinct.  Also, some unusual information came from consumers.  For example, in 
March 1997, the FTC received a complaint from Thomas Russ of Leesburg, Florida, a “cost-
conscious consumer” who owned a small real estate agency and shopped for office supplies “on a 
continuous basis.”15  The customer sent in two advertising circulars, one from a newspaper in 
Leesburg, Florida, where he lived and the other from a newspaper in nearby Orlando.  (See 
Figure 1, p____.)  Office Depot was the only superstore chain in Leesburg, but all three major 
chains competed in Orlando.  The ads were identical except for the prices, which were 
systematically lower in Orlando.  “I believe that the lack of competition in Leesburg explains the 
higher prices compared to the Office Depot stores in Orlando,” the consumer later wrote in a 
declaration.  “As a result of these price differences, I am very worried that Staples and Office 
Depot will be able to raise prices in markets where they directly compete, such as Orlando, 
Florida.”16    
5. Litigation Context 
                                                 
15  Transcript (May 23, 1997) at 137.  The FTC has published a study showing that strongly 
credible customer complaints and “hot” internal firm documents clearly predicting merger-
related anticompetitive effects make an agency challenge more likely.  Federal Trade 
Commission, Horizontal Merger Investigation Data, Fiscal Years 1996-2003 (available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/02/horizmerger.htm>). 
16  Transcript (May 23, 1997) at 166. The FTC staff also was able to compare an ad for Staples 
stores in Charlottesville, Virginia, where Staples competes with Office Depot, and 
Fredericksburg Virginia, where it faces no superstore competition.  The ads ran on the same day 
and involved the identical products and pictures; the only difference was that prices were lower 
in the city in which Staples and Office Depot competed head-to-head.  Both sets of 
advertisements were included in the evidence the FTC later presented in the preliminary 
injunction hearing. 
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In April 1997, seven months after Staples’ acquisition of Office Depot was announced, 
the FTC voted to seek a preliminary injunction in the Washington, D.C. federal district court.17  
The FTC had jurisdiction to review mergers since the agency was established in 1914.  The 
“glory days” of the Warren Court extended roughly from 1962, when the first merger was 
challenged under revised Section 7 of the Clayton Act, until 1974 when the Supreme Court, in a 
five-four opinion, upheld a merger in the face of a government challenge.  During that 12-year 
stretch, the government never lost a merger case in the Supreme Court.   
During the following two decades, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice 
and the FTC brought few cases, in part because of the advent of pre-merger notification in 1976, 
requiring that mergers above a certain size be notified to the government, which permitted the 
enforcement agencies to resolve most competitive problems by negotiating a consent settlement.  
When the agencies did go to court, moreover, they no longer could count on winning.  
Accompanying the mediocre won-loss record were two common perceptions about the FTC in 
particular:  first, that it would almost always settle with “half a loaf” in terms of remedy because 
it was afraid to go to court, and, second, in the rare instances when the agency did litigate it was 
out-lawyered both in numbers of opposing lawyers and their superior skill.18  The common 
                                                 
17  The merging firms had negotiated a possible settlement with the FTC staff that would have 
permitted the merger to go forward after sale of 63 stores to OfficeMax.  Chairman Pitofsky and 
two other commissioners, a majority of the Commission, voted to reject the settlement and 
challenge the proposed merger in court; one voted instead to accept the proposed settlement as a 
solution to the competitive problem; and one did not believe the proposed merger would harm 
competition and thus that it needed no settlement.  Press Release, FTC Rejects Proposed 
Settlement in Staples/Office Depot Merger (April 4, 1997) (available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1997/04/stapdep.htm>).   
18  The Staples case was no exception in terms of numbers of legal staff.  The FTC assigned 
perhaps five full-time lawyers to litigate the case, another ten back-ups.  The FTC also assigned 
eight economists full-time to the investigation and litigation and made what is likely the most 
extensive commitment of resources to econometric analysis in any government antitrust case, 
before or since.  By contrast, the merging firms reportedly fielded a team of 70, including 40 
Footnote continued on next page 
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perception was that the Staples/Office Depot challenge would be David versus Goliath and that 
David, seeking a market limited to office supply superstores, was pursuing an implausible 
theory.  The press and most stock-market speculators thought the court would not enjoin the 
merger. 
6. CEO Testimony 
 The compressed hearing schedule heightened the importance of every witness.  One of 
the highlights was the testimony of Thomas Stemberg, the Chairman and CEO of Staples.  
Stemberg was called to the witness stand on the fourth day of the hearing.  Through his 
testimony, which lasted more than four hours, both the merging firms and the FTC emphasized 
their main themes.   
On direct, Stemberg explained how he had pioneered the office superstore business, 
opening the first Staples store in May 1986.   From the start, Staples planned to attract customers 
by selling office supplies at a thirty to fifty percent discount compared to the prices charged by 
retail stationary stores.  By 1992, he said, he had come to “embrace the productivity loop” 
strategy.19  “The overwhelming reason people come to us is price,” Stemberg stated.  “[I]f we 
were ever to lose our low-price edge, … we would be in a lot of trouble.”20  
Stemberg further explained how the various other retailing channels for office supplies 
responded to Staples’ growth and success:  some traditional dealers formed buying cooperatives, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Footnote continued from previous page 
lawyers, and spent $13 million in legal fees and related costs. Amy Singer, Staple Removers, 
American Lawyer 45 (Oct. 1997). 
19  Transcript (May 22, 1997) at 209.  That strategy was described by an earlier defendant 
witness, a Wall Street retailing expert who helped invent the term, as a “virtuous circle” where 
lower costs are passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices or better service, and the 
resulting increase in sales leads to lower costs as a fraction of sales, allowing the firm to reduce 
costs and prices further.   
20 Transcript (May 22, 1997) at 209, 213-14. 
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mail order stationers lowered prices and reduced delivery times, and discount stores expanded 
assortments and cut prices.  As a result, prices in office product retailing generally have been 
declining.  “[E]verybody started pointing their guns at us” and became price competitive with the 
superstores, leading Stemberg to look for new ways to push the productivity loop.  “I believe this 
merger will allow us to ratchet down our prices to a whole new level,” he declared. 21  
Cross-examination centered on one of Staples’ marketing documents, the firm’s 1996 
pricing strategy, which stated “Over time our goal is to be competitively priced on a market-by-
market basis with other office superstores on all items.”  Stemberg acknowledged that the pricing 
document refers to office superstores as “primary competitors,” and that it describes markets as 
“non-competitive” if Staples has no superstore rivals, regardless of the presence of other types of 
retailers.22  In response to questioning, Stemberg agreed that Office Depot and OfficeMax have 
more impact on Staples’ prices and margins than other retailers; that Staples creates new price 
zones with lower prices in response to entry by rival office superstore chains but not in response 
to entry by mass merchandisers like K-Mart and Wal-Mart; and that the price index Staples 
developed shows that its prices in every Office Depot pricing zone are lower than its prices in the 
non-competitive zone and its prices in Staples’ warehouse club zones.  (A Staples document 
showing how its price index varies by zone is reprinted as Figure 2, p_____.)23  
7. Expert Testimony on Pricing 
                                                 
21 Transcript (May 22, 1997) at 229-31. 
22  On redirect, Stemberg noted that the company’s pricing manual also states, “Computer 
superstores, consumer electronics stores, and warehouse clubs are considered to be secondary 
competition.  Although the office superstores are our primary competition, we will conduct 
price-checks at secondary competitor locations so that we can be sensitive to their pricing.” 
23  On efficiencies, Stemberg acknowledged in cross-examination that if Staples had less 
competition in a market, it was not as necessary to pass on cost reductions as quickly as when it 
had competition, and that competition with Office Depot led Staples to reduce its costs. 
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The pricing evidence, around which the entire case pivoted, was the main subject of 
expert economic testimony on both sides.  The experts had undertaken an extensive analysis of 
the pricing data using statistical tools.   Although Judge Hogan later said he decided the case 
based on company documents rather than the econometrics,24 the econometric back and forth 
shaped how the two sides framed the pricing evidence in examining all the witnesses. 
The argument among experts was about why Staples prices are lower in markets where it 
faced superstore competition, as shown in the pricing documents emphasized by the government.  
The merging firms argued that the data were misleading.  Prices were high in non-competitive 
markets, they contended, for the same reason that other superstores had not entered those 
markets:  costs of doing business – for example, real estate rents – were high.  If so, the loss of 
superstore competition would not lead to higher prices.  Prices would stay low, near costs, in the 
merging firms’ view because they were kept honest by competition from non-superstore 
retailers.    To tell whether the merging firms were right when they contended that cross-city 
pricing comparisons were misleading, the economic experts for both sides looked at whether 
prices fell when Office Depot entered a market served by Staples, or vice versa.25  But the 
experts did not agree on how the data on the price response to entry should be interpreted.26   
                                                 
24     Ken Auletta, World War 3.0:  Microsoft and Its Enemies 221-22 (2001).    
25    The experts agreed that by focusing on price changes within metropolitan areas, where costs 
change slowly over time, they could largely avoid the possibility that price changes simply 
reflected cost changes. 
 
26   The debate is described from an FTC perspective in Jonathan B. Baker, Econometric 
Analysis in FTC v. Staples, 18 J. Pub. Pol’y & Marketing (1999).  For further discussion of the 
economic evidence by the various experts who testified in the case, see generally Serdar Dalkir 
and Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, Prices, Market Definition and the Effects of Merger:  Staples-
Office Depot (1997) in John E. Kwoka & Lawrence J. White, eds., The Antitrust Revolution 143 
(3d ed. 1999) (co-authored by the FTC’s primary economic expert);  Orley Ashenfelter, David 
Ashmore, Jonathan B. Baker, Suzanne Gleason, Daniel S. Hosken, Empirical Methods in Merger 
Footnote continued on next page 
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The econometric battle over how to interpret Staples’ pricing data shaped the 
examination of fact witnesses.  On direct examination, Thomas Stemberg cited cross-city 
differences in costs to explain why Staples prices were higher in a large metropolitan area served 
by multiple superstore chains, like Washington, D.C., than in a smaller city then served only by 
Staples, like Bangor. Maine.  On cross-examination, the FTC responded by focusing on the price 
response to superstore entry.  It sought to establish that a Staples store in Sumpter, South 
Carolina had been moved from a higher priced to a lower priced zone, reducing its prices, when 
it became evident that the store was in competition with Office Depot stores in Columbia and 
Florence, South Carolina.   
Although Judge Hogan did not base his decision on the econometric testimony, he 
interpreted the documentary evidence on pricing using the approach the experts had suggested 
for the data:  by analyzing how Staples altered its prices when Office Depot came into town, and 
not simply relying on price differences across cities in reaching his conclusions. 
8. Efficiencies Witnesses 
 Just before Thomas Stemberg testified, Staples called to the stand the company’s Senior 
Vice President of Integration to testify about the cost savings anticipated from the merger.  She 
described her blue chip credentials:  a college degree from Princeton, an M.B.A from MIT, a law 
degree from Harvard, work experience at Bain, a leading management consulting firm, and five 
years at Staples.  The integration process she managed, from which the company’s cost savings 
                                                                                                                                                             
Footnote continued from previous page 
Analysis:  Econometric Analysis of Pricing in FTC v. Staples, 13 Int’l J. Econ. Bus. 265 (2006) 
(co-authored by the FTC’s primary econometric expert); Jerry A. Hausman and Gregory K. 
Leonard, Documents vs. Econometrics in Staples (Sept. 1, 1997) (available at 
http://www.nera.com/Publication.asp?p_ID=2744) (co-authored by the merging firms’ economic 
expert). 
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projections were developed, involved fifteen task forces staffed by more than 200 executives 
from the two companies and supported by a host of highly-regarded management consulting 
firms, including the Boston Consulting Group, A. T. Kearney and Ernst & Young.   After months 
of work, the witness testified, she and her team concluded that the acquisition would generate $5 
billion or more in cost savings.27 
 The FTC’s first rebuttal witness was David Painter, the Assistant Director for Accounting 
in the agency’s Bureau of Competition.  After thirty years at the agency, working his way up 
through the ranks, he was about to retire.  Painter testified that in the three months before the 
hearing, he spent one thousand hours – averaging roughly seventy hours a week – reviewing the 
merging firms’ efficiency analyses and preparing his report.    
 Painter testified that he was “astounded” to discover that the efficiency claims asserted by 
the companies were five times what the board of directors was told to expect when asked to 
approve the transaction.  According to Painter, a substantial portion of the cost savings Staples 
claimed should not count because they could have been achieved by the merging firms on their 
own; in other cases the projected cost savings were based on assumptions inconsistent with the 
facts; and in still other instances, the estimation methodology employed by the Staples 
integration team was not documented adequately to permit him to evaluate their reliability.  After 
detailed, painstaking analysis, Painter concluded that roughly 40% of the estimated cost savings 
were improperly attributed to the merger and another third were unsubstantiated.  
                                                 
27  Cross examination focused on the extent to which the projected savings could have been 
obtained by Staples or Office Depot as stand alone firms, without need for merger.  Other 
problems with the projections were described by the FTC’s accounting expert.  As will be 
discussed in section 9.b below, Judge Hogan had a number of reservations about the efficiency 
claims.   
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 With time on the chess clock running short, the Staples side elected to respond to 
Painter’s methodological arguments in their brief, and to focus the cross-examination on 
Painter’s credibility.  The Staples lawyer highlighted the resources and credentials of the Staples 
efficiency team.  He asked about the large number of senior executives and top-flight 
management consulting firms involved in Staples’ task forces.  These consulting firms “all sound 
very impressive to me,” Painter agreed.  The cross-examination continued:  “They get a lot of 
MBAs coming right out of the best schools, don’t they, those firms?” Answer: “I think so.”28  
The cross-examining attorney drew the contrast with Painter’s credentials:  an accounting 
degree from a state university, three months in a management training program at a local 
department store, then three decades at the FTC.  Painter had no prior experience in the office 
products business, was not a CPA, had not completed any post-graduate work, and had not 
published in a professional journal.   
This cross-examination backfired.  Judge Hogan did not question Painter’s credibility.  
Instead, his opinion appears to go out of the way to affirm it.  Judge Hogan described Painter’s 
testimony as “compelling” and said he reached his conclusions as to efficiencies “based 
primarily on Mr. Painter’s testimony.” 
9. Opinion of the Court 
At an early point in his decision, Judge Hogan made remarks that would have given some 
degree of satisfaction to the defendants.  As we noted earlier, the key introductory legal issue 
was to describe the area of competition where the proposed merger would have a competitive 
effect.  In that connection, the Judge said the following: 
                                                 
28 Transcript (May 23, 1997) at 268. 
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“The Court recognizes that it is difficult to overcome the first blush 
or initial gut reaction of many people to the definition of relevant 
product market as the sale of consumable office supplies through 
office supply superstores.  The products in question are undeniably 
the same no matter who sells them and no one denies that many 
different types of retailers sell these products.  After all, a 
combined Staples-Office Depot would only have a 5.5% share of 
the overall market in consumable office supplies.”29 
Then in the conclusion of his opinion, Judge Hogan praised Thomas Stemberg and his 
colleagues as pioneers in introducing the office supply superstore concept that revolutionized the 
office supply business, not just by introducing their own steep discounts, but by forcing many 
others in a broadly defined description of the industry to focus on cutting their prices, leading to 
a general decrease in price of office products across the board.  As a result, manufacturers and 
suppliers were forced to implement efficiencies in their own businesses in order to compete in 
the sale of their products.30 
But between those two instances of encouraging words for Staples, the FTC won just 
about every point. 
a.  Pricing Evidence and Market Definition.  The heart of the FTC’s case was the 
assertion that prices were higher in metropolitan areas where there was only one superstore and 
that the merger would exacerbate that situation. With only a little hyperbole, George Cary, the 
lead attorney for the FTC, has termed Staples a “one fact case.”31 Judge Hogan carefully 
                                                 
29  Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1075.   
30  Id. at 1093.  
31  The one fact about prices was also the FTC’s answer to Staples claim that easy entry would 
solve the competitive problem.  If entry were so easy, the FTC asked rhetorically, why hadn’t 
new superstore competition undermined the price premium in cities lacking superstore 
competition?  In his opinion, Judge Hogan quickly disposed of defendants’ ease of entry 
argument.  He observed that the number of office supply superstores had dropped from 20 to 3 
over the past several years, and that failed superstore entrants included large, well-known retail 
establishments such as K-Mart, Montgomery Ward, Ames and Zayres.  Unless the new entrant 
Footnote continued on next page 
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examined the documents and the expert testimony on the pricing issue and concluded with 
respect to both Office Depot and Staples that their prices on average were more than 5% higher 
in cities where they faced no competition.32  The court noted that the anticompetitive effect of 
the merger was not necessarily that prices would rise from present levels, but only that they 
would be higher after the merger than they would have been had there been no merger.33 
The pricing evidence was ultimately the reason the FTC succeeded in court.  There were 
two routes by which it could have been employed to decide the case for the government.  The 
FTC, in litigating the case, and the court, in deciding it, framed the pricing evidence as a basis 
for defining a narrow product market, of consumable office supplies sold through superstores.   
The court noted that if the merger were to go through the combined firm would have a 100% 
market share in 15 metropolitan areas and a dominant market share in 42 other metropolitan 
areas across the country.34  If a merger creates a monopoly, it is generally easy to conclude that 
competition will be harmed, with little need for detailed analysis of competitive effects.35 
The court was encouraged to see the product market as narrow, confined to the superstore 
distribution channel, through a litigation tactic employed by the FTC lawyers.  In a motion to the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Footnote continued from previous page 
could open a large number of stores to achieve economies of scale equivalent to the three 
existing superstores, it could not be an effective competitor.  The court concluded that even if 
some large chain stores could enter the market, there was simply no evidence in the record 
before him that they would in fact do so in the event of a post-merger price increase.   
 
32  Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1076.  
33  Id. at 1092.   
34  Id. at 1081.  Geographic market definition was not contested.  Judge Hogan pointed out that 
just about the only thing the parties in the case did not disagree about was that metropolitan areas 
are the appropriate geographic markets.  Id. at 1073.   
35  The government’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines indicate that efficiencies are unlikely to 
carry the day in a merger to monopoly or near-monopoly. 
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court, they suggested that Judge Hogan get in his car and drive to Rockville, a northern suburb of 
Washington, DC, where he would find office supply superstores and all the other retail outlets 
defendants’ claimed were in the market.  It would have been awkward for defense counsel to 
resist the idea that the Judge should take a look at the stores for himself, and they did not oppose 
the suggestion.  Judge Hogan accepted the invitation, and one weekend drove around visiting the 
various outlets, including Staples, Office Depot, CompUSA, Best Buy, CVS, K-Mart, Giant 
Food and Wal-Mart.  Based on his observations he found in the superstores a unique 
combination of size, selection, depth, breadth of inventory and the type of customers they target 
and attract.  His conclusion: 
“No one entering a Wal-Mart would mistake it for an office 
superstore.  No one entering Staples or Office Depot would 
mistakenly think he or she was in Best Buy or CompUSA.  You 
certainly know an office superstore when you see one.”36 
Judge Hogan noted that the products involved were the same no matter where they were 
purchased and therefore, in a sense, all sources could be regarded as a market.  But he quickly 
added that there could be “well-defined submarkets” in which sellers could raise price without 
losing an unacceptable portion of their business, and noted that the submarket concept had been 
recognized by the Supreme Court and lower court cases many times in the past.37   
The FTC and the court could instead have chosen to frame the pricing evidence another 
way:  as direct evidence of anticompetitive effect within a broader office supplies product 
market, not limited to the superstore distribution channel, in which the merging firms’ market 
shares were low.  Under this alternative description of the evidence on prices, the merger would 
                                                 
36 Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1079.   
37 See id. at 1075 (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962);  Rothery Storage 
& Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986);  Beatrice Foods Co. v. FTC, 
540 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1976).  
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represent an example of harmful unilateral competitive effects of a merger among sellers of 
differentiated products, reflecting a loss of localized competition within a broad market.  This 
would have been a more difficult route for proving the case, however, because it would have 
required the court to conclude that the direct evidence from prices was more probative than the 
contrary implication of the market shares,38 and because unilateral effects analysis, while well 
established at the antitrust enforcement agencies,39 had only tentative acceptance in the courts.40   
An FTC victory on this basis, therefore, could have been more difficult to sustain on appeal than 
one based on a merger to monopoly within a narrow product market.   
The FTC staff, comparing these alternatives, decided to challenge the merger within a 
narrow product market, rather than as leading to harmful unilateral effects within a broad product 
market.  They argued the pricing evidence in terms of market definition, and prevailed on that 
basis.  Some observers nevertheless view Staples as reflecting acceptance by the court of the 
unilateral competitive effects theory in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.  George Cary, the 
FTC’s lead attorney, put it this way:  
“I do think of Staples as a unilateral effects case. … Ultimately. I 
think it has to be viewed as a unilateral effects case because the 
proof that was put forward in defining the product market was the 
closeness of competition between Staples and Office Depot and the 
                                                 
38 In a broader market, market concentration and its increase would have been much lower, 
posssibly so low as to place the merger within the safe harbors for concentration set forth in the 
government’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines.  Although a number of economists have argued 
that this should not matter if unilateral effects of a merger among sellers of differentiated 
products can be established through direct evidence, the low Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
statistics resulting from defining a broad product market would have presented another litigation 
challenge for the government had the case been framed this way.   
39  This unilateral effects theory had been introduced into the government’s Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines in 1992, and was routinely employed in the internal review of mergers by both the 
FTC and the Justice Department. 
40  In  New York v. Kraft General Foods, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), Judge Kimba 
Wood had accepted the theory “arguendo”. 
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effect of that competition on prices, without regard to competition 
from other firms.”41   
 
From this perspective, the narrow market definition adopted for the purpose of litigation operated 
as a vehicle for recognizing unilateral effects in an uncertain legal environment.42    
b. Efficiencies.  Defendants had submitted an “Efficiencies Analysis” predicting that 
the combined company would achieve savings of between 4.9 and 6.5 billion over the five years 
following the merger, and that two-thirds of those savings would be passed on to consumers.  
They claimed that these cost savings would outweigh any possible anticompetitive effect from 
merger.43 
This claim drew the court into an exceptionally ambiguous area of antitrust.  The 
Supreme Court in 1967 had announced that “[p]ossible economies cannot be used as a defense to 
illegality in Section 7 merger case.”44  On the other hand a significant number of lower courts 
had disregarded the Supreme Court directive and recognized the defense,45 and the Department 
                                                 
41 Roundtable Discussion:  Unilateral Effects Analysis After Oracle, 19 Antitrust 8, 9 (Spring 
2005). 
 
42 See generally, Jonathan B. Baker, Stepping Out in an Old Brown Shoe: In Qualified Praise of 
Submarkets, 68 Antitrust L. J. 203, 209-17 (2000).  Not every unilateral effects case will be 
amenable to reframing as alleging a merger to monopoly within a narrow product market, 
however, as some narrow markets look more gerrymandered than others.  See United States v. 
Oracle Corp., 331 F. 2d 1098 (N.D. Calif. 2004) (unilateral effects allegation was unsuccessful 
because the government did not prove a narrow product market within which the merger would 
create a near-monopoly).  
 
43  Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1089-1090.   
44  FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 579 (1967). 
45 See FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1222 (11th Cir. 1991) (acknowledging that 
claims of efficiency can rebut the government's prima facie case, but finding insufficient 
evidence in record);  United States v. Country Lake Foods, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 669, 680 (D. Minn. 
1990) (efficiency evidence relevant but not necessary because proposed transaction raised no 
anticompetitive threat);  United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251, 1289-91 
(N.D. Ill. 1989), aff'd, 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 295 (1990) (efficiency 
evidence introduced, but violation nevertheless found because efficiencies may not have been 
Footnote continued on next page 
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of Justice-FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines had been revised earlier in the year, just before the 
Staples case was argued, to incorporate an efficiency defense where the claimed efficiencies 
were significant, credible, verified and likely to outweigh any anticompetitive effect.46  Judge 
Hogan acknowledged the uncertainty of the issue as a matter of law but was willing to assume 
efficiencies could be a viable defense.  He concluded, however, that the defendants’ efficiencies 
evidence was inadequate to sustain their position.47 
As we noted earlier, Judge Hogan credited the testimony of Commission expert David 
Painter over the testimony of defendants’ efficiency witnesses.48  As to the claim of cost savings 
of $4.9 billion over five years, the court observed that this amount was five times greater than the 
figures presented to the two boards of directors of the merging companies when their boards 
approved the transaction.  The claim was also far greater than the numbers submitted to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission.  The court also noted that the savings were largely 
unverified and that much of the total could have been achieved by either company absent a 
merger.  Finally, the court expressed extreme skepticism over the claim that two-thirds of the 
savings would be passed through to consumers in light of evidence that showed, historically, that 
Staples had passed through 15-17% in the past.49  The bottom line for Judge Hogan was that the 
efficiency claims offered an inaccurate prediction of the proposed acquisitions’ probable effect. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Footnote continued from previous page 
unique to merger and in any event were not sufficiently substantial to overcome anticompetitive 
effects). 
46  1992 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines § 4 (Revised April 8, 1997), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.htm (last visited June 29, 2006).   
47  Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1089-1090.   
48  Id. at 1089.   
49  Id. at 1089-1090.   
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Based on his review of the evidence, the Judge granted the Commission’s request for a 
preliminary injunction and shortly thereafter Staples and Office Depot dropped the deal.50 
10. Future Impact:  Why the Staples Case was a Turning Point in Merger 
Enforcement 
 
One significant impact of the FTC’s victory in Staples was to demonstrate the agency’s 
willingness to litigate with the necessary resources, even if it meant short-changing other 
portions of agency activity.   A leading investment banker described the FTC’s victory in Staples 
as “a particularly dramatic show-stopper, a sign of the [government’s] new assertive posture and 
of the courts’ willingness to block a deal.”51  In the years following the Staples decision, the FTC 
found itself in court several times advancing antitrust challenges to mergers:  successfully 
blocking two simultaneous mergers among drug wholesalers that would have reduced the 
number of major firms from four to two;52 stopping the merger of Beech-Nut and Heinz in the 
baby food market (a deal that would have reduced the number of baby food suppliers in the 
United States from three to two);53 and challenging the proposed acquisition by British 
                                                 
50  See Richard Tomkins, US Court Upholds Ban On Staples Merger, The Financial Times 
(London), July 1, 1997, at 32.   
51  Bruce Wasserstein, Big Deal:  The Battle for Control of America’s Leading Corporations, 
148 (1998).  Perhaps the arbitrageurs who spent unprecedented sums on the Staples case - first 
betting that the FTC would not bring the case and, second, that the agency would lose in court - 
will become more cautious in betting against the government.  By one estimate, the “arbs” lost 
approximately $150 million by guessing wrong on both results.  Wall Street Journal, C-2 (July 2, 
1997). 
52  FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 68 (D.D.C. 1998). 
53    FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001), rev’g 116 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D.D.C. 
2000)..  The present authors had different views on the wisdom of this case, Pitofsky as 
Chairman of the agency that successfully challenged the merger and Baker as economic expert 
for the merging firms.  For two perspectives, see Thomas B. Leary, An Inside Look at the Heinz 
Case, 16 Antitrust, No. 2 at 32 (Spring 2002) (views of Commissioner Leary) and Jonathan B. 
Baker, Efficiencies and High Concentration: Heinz Proposes to Acquire Beech-Nut (2001), in 
John E. Kwoka, Jr. and Lawrence J. White, eds., The Antitrust Revolution 150 (4th ed. 2004). 
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Petroleum of ARCO which would have consolidated major oil-producing assets in Alaska.  
When BP agreed to divest the overlapping Alaskan assets, the rest of the deal was allowed to 
proceed.54  The agency still allowed the vast majority (perhaps 97%) of mergers to go through 
without serious investigation, but clearly was ready to litigate if that was the right thing to do. 
One result of energizing government enforcement of antitrust was that the agencies were 
taken more seriously as litigation opponents, and there was a recognition by the private bar that 
clients could expect extensive data requests and careful data analysis.  Incidentally, the 
Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division enjoyed a similar change in attitudes as a result of its 
successful challenge to business tactics by Microsoft, including respect for the quality of 
government litigation.   
The Staples litigation also illustrated the increasing importance of economics to merger 
analysis since the Warren Court era, when the government seemingly needed only to show up in 
court to win.  The Commission’s case in Staples was based almost entirely on documents (it 
called only three fact witnesses) and focused on a single issue:  the effect of the proposed merger 
on prices.  The agency’s economic presentation, primarily through the testimony of two 
economic experts and an accounting expert on the Commission’s staff, was sophisticated and in 
the end persuasive.55  Judge Richard Posner, one of the major figures in introducing economic 
                                                 
54 In the Matter of The British Petroleum Co. p.l.c., 127 F.T.C. 515 (1999) (consent order).  
Other Commission victories included FTC v. Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d 151 (D.D.C. 
2000).  While the Commission’s winning record in antitrust challenges after Staples was 
impressive, the FTC did occasionally lose a case, and had particular difficulty in court prevailing 
in its efforts to block mergers of hospitals in local communities.  For example, see Federal Trade 
Commission v. Tenet Health Care, 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999). 
55   Cooperation among lawyers and economists at the Commission had in the past been uneven 
and at times less than constructive.  The Staples trial was a different matter.  Leading figures in 
both the Bureau of Economics and Bureau of Competition strongly supported the case and the 
cooperation between the two groups of staff was as good as it is ever likely to be.   
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analysis into antitrust, and into law generally, stated at the conclusion of his review of the FTC’s 
performance in Staples that “[e]conomic analysis of mergers had come of age.”56 
In addition, the Staples opinion solidified the view that antitrust theory grew primarily 
from initiatives of the enforcement agencies (guidelines and cases) and cases in the lower courts, 
largely because the Supreme Court had not reviewed a merger case on the merits since 1974.57  
Hopefully that will change in the next few years.   
For most of its history, a succession of independent scholars and other analysts have 
consistently found the FTC wanting in the performance of its duties.  It was often referred to as 
“The Little Old Lady of Pennsylvania Avenue.”  One courtroom victory does not justify the 
existence of an agency, but the staff’s performance against outstanding and experienced antitrust 
lawyers in Staples was admirable.58  In a subsequent case, the next major merger challenged in 
court by the FTC, Judge Stanley Sporkin, a prominent figure in the world of business and 
regulatory law, noted the fine performance of the FTC in court and described the agency as 
revitalized.59 
                                                 
56   Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 158 (2d ed. 2001).   
57   United States v. General Dynamics, 415 U.S. 486 (1974).  Coincidentally, Donald Kempf, 
lead attorney for Staples, had represented General Dynamics in that case.  The Supreme Court 
issued substantive antitrust merger decisions in three bank cases shortly after General Dynamics, 
but General Dynamics is generally considered the Court’s most recent interpretation of Clayton 
Act §7.   
58  By one report, “most people who packed in to hear the case every day agreed that the 
government out-lawyered the defense in the courtroom .…”  Amy Singer, Staple Removers, 
American Lawyer 46 (Oct. 1997). 
59  FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d  34, 68 (D.D.C. 1998).   


